↓Skip to main content
Labour Laws
  1. Case Law/

Airtel Bangladesh Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Chairman, First labour Court, Dhaka and Ors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH (HIGH COURT DIVISION)

Writ Petition Nos. 1105-1123 and 1251 of 2012

Decided On: 03.04.2014

Appellants: Airtel Bangladesh Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Respondent: Chairman, First Labour Court, Dhaka and Ors.

Hon’ble Judges/Coram: Syed Refaat Ahmed and Syed A.B. Mahmudul Huq, JJ.

Counsels: For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Tanjib-ul-Alam, Advocate

JUDGMENT

Syed Refaat Ahmed, J.

  1. These twenty Writ Petitions are bound by common questions of interpretation of law applicable to similar facts by reason of which these have been heard together and are now being disposed of by this common Judgment. Given further the fact that the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in all these Writ Petitions has placed his submissions based on the records in Writ Petition No. 1106 of 2012, this Court proceeds to dispose of all these Writ Petitions by reference to that particular application under Article 102 of the Constitution and the consequential Rule Nisi issued on 1-2-2012. This is of course without prejudice to the facts, issues and merits of the other Writ Petitions involved.

  2. In Writ Petition No. 1106 of 2012, the Rule Nisi was issued calling upon the Respondent No. 1 to show cause as to why the Order No. 1 dated 24-11-2009 passed by the Respondent No. 1 First labour Court registering BLL, (IR) Case No. 362 of 2009 and Violation Misc. Case No. 181 of 2011 arising out of the aforesaid BLL Case, now pending before the First labour Court, Dhaka, should not be declared to have been passed/commenced without lawful authority and are of no legal effect and/or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.

  3. The Petitioner No. 1 Airtel Bangladesh Limited (“Airtel”) is a Limited Company engaged in providing telecommunication services in Bangladesh in the course of which it regularly procures outsourcing services variously from outsourcing service-providers. The Respondent No. 2 (as similarly placed like all the other Respondent employees of the Pro forma Respondent Elite Logistic Services Limited (“ELSL”) in the other related Writ Petitions) is an employee of ELSL in which capacity he has been posted in the Petitioner No. 1 Company, i.e., Airtel as a driver. It is stated that ELSL, engaged as it is in outsourcing business, has been supplying, inter alia, personnel services support services etc. to various businesses including Airtel.

  4. Airtel is aggrieved by and herein impugns the BLL (IR) Case No. 362 of 2009 along with the interim Order dated 24-11-2009 passed by the First labour Court, Dhaka in the said BLL Case directing Airtel to maintain status quo with regard to the conditions of employment of the Respondent No. 2. Airtel further impugns the proceedings in Violation Misc. Case No. 181 of 2011 filed by the Respondent No. 2 for Airtel’s alleged violation of the said Order of status quo.

  5. On 1-5-2006 and 27-10-2009, Airtel entered into contracts (“the Agreements”) with ELSL for outsourcing of, amongst other, drivers from time to time to work at the Head Office/Branch Offices of Airtel whereby it was clearly mentioned, inter alia, that the drivers so outsourced would be deemed to be employees of ELSL.

  6. The Agreement of 1-5-2006, titled the “Contract For The Provision Of Auxiliary Services”, identifies ELSL as the Contractor and Warid Telecom International Ltd. LLC (as subsequently came to be known as Airtel) as the Service Receiver as is “desirous of engaging the services of the Contractor for providing certain personnel such as… Driver,..”. The consideration for the contract is specifically identified as the service charge payable by the Service Receiver to the Contractor in return for which the latter undertook to render services “by way of providing trained auxiliary staffs”. Predicated on this contractual term, the Agreement at the very outset establishes that the staff or personnel provided by the Contractor as part of the contract services “shall at all times be considered the employees of the Contractor”. That status of employer and employee being so established under the Agreement between ELSL and any given personnel independently of the Service Receiver, the Agreement spells out the rights and obligations of ELSL with regard to outsourcing personnel in terms of selection or recruitment, payment of salary and allowance, regulation of holidays and leave etc., collectively constituting the terms of employment establishing an employer and employee relationship between ELSL and any individual member of its staff like the Respondent No. 2. It is to be noted in this regard that the Agreement of 27-10-2009 between ELSL and Warid Telecom further builds on the terms and conditions of provision of auxiliary services by ELSL as the Contractor without in any way detracting from the employer and employee relationship already established between ELSL and the Respondent No. 2 as early as in 2006.

  7. In furtherance of the Agreements, ELSL recruited a large number of drivers including the Respondent No. 2 on its own account without any involvement of Airtel and subsequently placed some of them with Airtel. The Respondent No. 2 had at all material times while working in the premises of Airtel been employed by ELSL evident in the appointment letter and ID card issued by ELSL. Airtel had, evidently, in no sense engaged in any such activity vis–vis the Respondent No. 2 in this regard. Airtel asserts that since the Respondent No. 2 was, therefore, not appointed by Airtel, that establishment had no control or authority over the incidences of employment of the Respondent No. 2. Accordingly, it was only ELSL alone as the appointing and retaining authority that had the power and legal capacity to take any disciplinary action against the Respondent No. 2, including that of effecting his dismissal, if required.

  8. Elaborating on the fact of the contractual consideration for the Agreements of 2006 and 2009 being in the form of service charge payable by Warid/Airtel as Service Receiver to ELSL, it is stated in the Application that the Respondent No. 2 driver was supplied by EL SL, to work in the Warid/ Airtel establishment against which ELSL submitted monthly invoices to Airtel prepared on the basis of Time/Attendance Sheets provided by Airtel. The only payment obligation by way of consideration undertaken by Airtel under the Agreements comprised of making payments to ELSL against the said monthly invoices submitted by the latter. This necessarily obviated the necessity under the very schemes of the Agreements for Airtel either to make or in any way be under any contractual obligation to make any payment to the Respondent No. 2 directly. Notably, therefore, the bottom line of the dynamics of Airtel’s relationship with the Respondent No. 2 is that the company at all material terms operated within a strictly limited and well-defined contractual sphere. In this regard, administrative control over the terms of service of the Respondent No. 2 clearly, exclusively and overwhelmingly lay with ELSL. The Respondent No 2 was recruited by ELSL on its own account, received his salary including overtime allowance, bonus etc. from ELSL as determined by ELSL and could only, therefore, be dismissed by ELSL.

  9. It is against this factual backdrop that the Respondent No. 2 while being an employment with ELSL filed BLL Case No. 362 of 2009 under section 213 of the Bangladesh labour act, 2006 (“Act”) praying (as did the other Respondent drivers in the other Writ Petitions), inter-alia, for a direction upon Airtel in general to pay all the benefits and allowances otherwise claimed by “permanent workers” working in the Airtel establishment. This was accompanied by an application for an interim injunction under section 216 of the act against Airtel seeking to injunct any attempt by Airtel to dismiss or discharge the Respondent No. 2. This having elicited a response from the Respondent No. 1 First labour Court in the form of an interim Order favouring the Respondent No. 2 applicant before it and directing Airtel to maintain status quo with regard to the appointment of the Respondent No. 2, it is contended by Airtel that the First labour Court erred on the point of jurisdiction since in law in the circumstances it did not have the authority to entertain the application under section 213, thereby, necessitating the filing of this Writ Petition. Airtel is further aggrieved by the fact of the Respondent No. 2 having additionally filed before the First labour Court a Violation Misc. Case No. 181 of 2011 for ostensible violation by Airtel of the said status quo Order previously granted.

  10. The learned Advocate for the Petitioners in all these Writ petitions Mr. Tanjib-Ul-Alam has taken care to apprise this Court that the Violation Miscellaneous Cases in all these instances have arisen in the context of Dismissal Orders variously issued by the appointing and retaining authority ELSL affecting the twenty drivers supplied to Airtel in its capacity as employer. This is a fact that is notably clearly asserted by each such Respondent No. 2 driver evident in the applications filing the Violation Miscellaneous cases, thereby, implicitly acknowledging a subsisting contractual relationship of employer-employee between ELSL and each such driver but without further elaborating on the same. It is to be noted that other than this stray and tacit acknowledgment of a probable and extant employer and employee and master and servant relationship between ELSL and each such driver in question, all these individuals have otherwise striven to establish Airtel as their rightful employer against whom their putative rights as employees awaited declaration by the First labour Court in each case in ostensible exercise of authority and jurisdiction under section 213 of the act. According to Mr. Tanjib-ul-Alam therein lies the crux of the Petitioners’ case in all these Writ Petitions seeking this Court’s determination whether the First labour Court at all had any jurisdiction reserved to it to entertain each such individual case under section 213 of the act in the facts and circumstances. It is in that context that the Petitioners emphatically state that it ought to have been evident to the Respondent No. 1 First labour Court that the Respondent No. 2 drivers in fact and in law were retained as employees of ELSL and not by Airtel as such and that any claim of any of the Respondent No. 2 drivers pertaining to such employment was maintainable against ELSL and not Airtel.

  11. Given that no one has appeared in any of these Writ Petitions to contest the Rules Nisi before this Court, Mr. Tanjib-ul-Alam has had the sole responsibility to submit on the issues of law that reign supreme in all these cases. The focus of such submission primarily falls on the true ambit and purport of the provisions in section 213 of the act under which all the BLL cases were filed by each of the Respondent No. 2 drivers against Airtel and under which the Respondent No. 1 First labour Court purported to exercise its jurisdiction. Section 213 reads thus:

“২১৩। শ্রম আদালতে দরখাস্ত।-কোন যৌথ দরকষাব প্রতিনিধি অথবা কোন মালিক অথবা কোন শ্রমিক এই আইন কোন রোয়েদাদ বা কোন নিষ্পত্তি বা চুক্তির অধীন বা দ্বারা নিশি বা প্রদত্ত কোন অধিকার প্রয়োগের জন্য শ্রম আদালতে দরখ করিতে পারিবেন।”

(Emphasis provided by this Court)

  1. The above provision permits of translation to the effect that Collective Bargaining Agent or any employer or worker may apply to the labour Court “for the enforcement of any right” guaranteed or secured by or under this act or any award, settlement or contract. A related and equally significant provision of the law that merits consideration in the facts and circumstances is section 2(65) of the act which defines a শ্রমিক or a worker as:

“শ্রমিক অর্থ শিক্ষাধীনসহ কোন ব্যক্তি, তাহার চাকুরীর শর্তাবলী প্রকাশ্য বা উহা যে ভাবেই থাকুক না কেন, যিনি কোন প্রতিষ্ঠানে বা শিল্পে সরাসরিভাবে বা কোন ঠিকাদারের মাধ্যমে মজুরী বা অর্থের বিনিময়ে কোন দক্ষ, অদক্ষ, কায়িক, কারিগরী ব্যবসা উন্নয়নমূলক অথবা কেরানীগিরির কাজ করার জন্য নিযুক্ত হন, কিন্তু প্রধানতঃ প্রশাসনিক বা ব্যবস্থাপনামূলক কাজে দায়িত্বমূলক কাজে দায়িত্বপ্রাপ্ত কোন ব্যক্তি ইহার অন্তর্ভূক্ত হইবেন না।”

(Emphasis provided by this Court)

It suffices to note here that so much of the section 2(65) definition as is relevant for our purpose identifies a worker as one who is employed in an establishment or industry directly or through a contractor.

  1. This Court is of the view that in order to understand the true purport and ambit of the labour Court’s authority under section 213 it is essential first to visit the definition clause in section 2(65) with a view to clarifying the specific connotation of the term “worker” so defined. Indeed Mr. Tanjib-ul-Alam has submitted that the term “worker” cannot stand in a vacuum and must be considered in conjunction with the related term “employed”, as indeed appears in section 2(65), and that these two terms must be considered as inextricably linked giving rise to a specific meaning of the term শ্রমিক or “worker”. This Court finds in that regard that the relationship of an employer and employee as contemplated in the section 2(65) presupposes primarily a formal contractual bind between one employed and an employing/appointing authority. It is this Court’s view that such contractual bind dictates that an employed person not merely works for or under a managing authority or management but is additionally formally employed by such authority in a substantive sense. This necessarily entails or involves such employing authority having direct control and supervision of appointment, payment of salary and benefits, discipline and removal and dismissal from and termination of service. In other words, the employing authority must necessarily have reserved to itself powers of control and supervision over wide-ranging incidences of employment that collectively merit categorization as the terms and conditions of service akin to those spelt out, as for example, in the Agreements of 1-5-2006 and 27-10-2009 and which fell to be dealt with under the purview and by authority of ELSL exclusively vis-a-vis the Respondent No. 2 driver. In this regard, this Court wholly subscribes further to the interpretation given to a similar definition of “worker” by the Supreme Court of India in Workmen Food Corporation of India vs M/s. Food Corporation of India reported in (1985) AIR 670 at paragraph 11 as reads thus:

“The essential conditions of a person being a workman within the terms of the definition is that he should be employed to do the work in that industry and there should be, in other words, an employment of his by the employer and that there should be a relationship between the employer and him as between employer and employee or master and servant. Unless a person is thus employed, there can be no question of him being a worker within the definition of the terms and contained in the act.”

  1. Predicated on that understanding of the connotation of the term “worker” this Court has further considered, and as submitted by Mr. Alam, the elaboration provided by the Appellate Division of the definition of a “worker” under section 2(XXVIII) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (“IRO”) which, considered along with the Employment of labour Standing Orders act, 1965, in fact constitutes the essential basis of the codification of the act of 2006. The expression “worker” as defined in section 2(XXVIII) of the IRO stood thus:

“any person including an apprentice not falling within the definition of employer who is employed in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or clerical work whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied”.

(emphasis provided by this Court).

  1. It is noted that the Appellate Division in Karnaphuli PMWU vs KPM Employees Union reported in II ADC (2005), 300 was faced with the question of the extent to which the definition above contemplated the status of workers who are engaged in Karnaphuli Paper Mills (“KPM”) through contractors, thereby, qualifying to be treated, if at all, as workers of the KPM establishment itself. In other words, the enquiry was of the extent to which each such worker could be said to be bound in a relationship of employer and employee with KPM. In examining that claimed status and entitlement as KPM workers/employee the Appellate Division pertinently pursued a line of enquiry that focused primarily on the true construction of the terms of employment in each case to determine whether the incidences of employment of each individual claimant with KPM were present or not. Such exercise would finally determine whether any individual claimant was actually employed by KPM or by the concerned independent contractor personally. It is in that context that Justice Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury laid down what this Court views to be the most succinct and authoritative interpretation of the true import of the words “directly or through a contractor”, featured in section 2(XXVIII) of the IRO and incidentally in section 2(65) of the act with which we are presently concerned.

  2. Indeed a worker may be one who is employed by the management directly e.g., by an entity like Airtel, the Petitioner before us, or through a contractor e.g., in the likeness of an outsourcing enterprise like ELSL before us and in both instances will be considered as employed by the management itself, provided, as Justice Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury stressed, in “either case there [is] a contract of employment between the management and the person employed”. Applied to this case, that would mean the existence of a direct contractual nexus between each individual driver and the Airtel management binding one to the other by privity of contract. That privity, this Court finds, is, however, significantly absent in all the cases before us. For what the present facts manifest is yet a different scenario distinguishable in Justice Chowdhury’s words by all the important element of each of the twenty drivers in these Writ Petitions working instead “under the control and supervision of the contractor”. In other words, such direct control and supervision by a contractor wholly excludes the possibility of employment by the management itself i.e., by Airtel in the present instances. The fact that each such driver works on the premises of Airtel makes no substantive difference in this regard. They remained at all material times workers under the employment of the independent contractor ELSL and ELSL alone.

  3. Premised on that essential determinant of the status of a worker under the IRO, and by extension under the act, being that of a person who enters into a contract of service under the management itself (i.e., in the capacity and status of any appointing entity like the Petitioner Airtel before us), Justice Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury observed thus at paragraph 12 at page 303:

“In order to arrive at the conclusion whether a person working in the establishment is a worker under the establishment or a worker under an independent contractor, that is, whether the employment is by and under the establishment through a contractor or by the independent contractor for the benefit of whom the employment is given, one has to look to the terms of employment.”

(Emphasis provided by this Court)

  1. Having this focused on the proximity of the contractual bind between an individual with an establishment and/or a contractor being determinable by reference essentially to the terms of employment, Justice Bimalendu Bikash Roy Chowdhury appears to this Court to subscribe to the ratio above cited in the Workmen Food Corporation of India case in narrowing down the test of a worker’s status to that of an existence of a relationship of employer and employee spelt out in such terms of employment. Accordingly, the learned Judge observed thus:

“The terms of employment must establish a relationship of master and servant or employer and employee between the person employed and the establishment and it is not enough that a person is working in the premises of a certain establishment”

(Emphasis Added by this Court).

  1. It is in this context Mr. Tanjib-ul-Alam has satisfactorily submitted that the Respondent No. 2 driver in Writ Petition No. 110 of 2012, by his very terms of employment discernible from the Agreements of 2006 and 2009 falls in all aspects of his employment to be absolutely controlled and supervised by the independent Contractor ELSL under whose payroll he and the other Respondent drivers in all these Writ Petitions were at all material times and by dint of which each such driver received payments from the Contractor ELSL. Such payroll was maintained separately and independently by the Contractor of ELSL exclusively of Airtel with the latter having no authority of hiring and firing any of the Respondent No. 2 drivers in the Writ Petitions. It is submitted satisfactorily that clearly these contractual arrangements squarely fall into the scheme of the Agreements of 2006 and 2009 between the Service Receiver Airtel and the Contractor ELSL marked by the payment of the service charge payable by Airtel to ELSL.

  2. This Court finds that nothing in the contractual regime governing these cases has gone to establish to the contrary that any of the Respondent No. 2 drivers discharged their duties and contractual obligations of service for consideration due them directly by Airtel in the form of salary earned. In fact, the Appellate Division in the Karnaphuli PMWU Case presided over a rather similar factual scenario of the contractor submitting bills for services rendered to an establishment and payment under the bill being satisfied upon receipt of the bill amount by the independent contractor into its account from which it would be at liberty to disburse payments of salary and benefits to each individual member of its staff otherwise working in the premises of KPM.

  3. Considered in terms of a juxtaposition of competing rights and obligations in these cases therefore, arises the manifest scenario of the First labour Court being called upon to undertake an exercise of establishing or declaring a set of rights rather than dealing with rights that are extant and, therefore, statutorily that enforceable by it. It is in this context that Mr. Tanjib-ul-Alam submits that the purport of the jurisdiction granted the labour Court under section 213 of the act is that of enforcing established rights arising from the variously identified scenarios therein as opposed to taking on itself the task of declaring or establishing rights not presently there but contended to be in a putative form. To engage in the latter exercise, Mr. Alam submits, would amount in law to the labour Court exceeding its authority in jurisdiction, travelling beyond the jurisdictional parameters unique to section 213, consequently arrogating authority not within the legislative intent, erring in law and, thereby, risking an intervention in judicial review by this Court in a Writ of Certiorari.

  4. It is against this backdrop that this Court finds that the term প্রয়োগ as figures in section 213 of the act readily permits the enforcement of existing rights as opposed to an establishment, creation or declaration of rights anew. In the present facts and circumstances, given this Court’s finding above that absent a contractual bind between the Respondent No. 2 driver and Airtel resulting in a substantive employer employee relationship between the two there is necessarily no existing enforceable right that has at any material date accrued to the Respondent No. 2 driver that would permit of consideration and disposal by the labour Court by invocation of section 213 of the act.

  5. Clearly, however, the Respondent No. 1 First labour Court by purported exercise of jurisdiction under section 213 notwithstanding the above scenario has proceeded to clothe section 213 with an interpretation that would amount to the labour Court being reposed with jurisdiction in far excess of that otherwise expressly provided for. Therein lies the First labour Court’s erroneous interpretation of the law proceeding from a misconception of the law and resulting in an exercise of jurisdiction which it never was possessed of.

  6. This fine distinction of an extant right and the establishment of a putative right as clearly defines the boundaries and substantive limits of the labour Court’s powers under section 213, by this Court’s understanding came to be recognized vis-a-vis section 34 of the IRO which as a precursor in many way of section 213 of the act emphasized on that distinction.

  7. In this instance as well the Appellate Division in Chairman, Power Development Board vs Chairman, labour Court, Khulna Division reported in 1981 BLD (AD) 59 held that where the relief prayed for is the establishment of a right of an employee as opposed to the enforcement of any existing right guaranteed or secured under an award or settlement, section 34 could not be relied upon.

  8. Following that construction it is equally this Court’s finding that the Respondent No. 2 driver having sought the First labour Court’s intervention under section 213 by seeking effectively an establishment or declaration of a right that otherwise does not accrue to him in the context of the relationship shared with the Petitioner Airtel, his invocation of section 213 was clearly misconceived and the entertainment of that application by the First labour Court was Clearly erroneous leaving all interventions by and Orders stemming consequentially from the labour Court to be equally deprived of all legal authority and to be of no legal effect.

  9. This Court in this regard, clearly finds that the First labour Court being a tribunal with limited jurisdiction, mistook the law as, declared in section 213 of the act and by that reason clearly asked itself the wrong question. That is one into which, in the words of Lord Diplock in O’Reilly vs Mackman reported in [1982] 3 All ER 1124, declaring the virtues of the principles elaborated in Anisminic Ltd vs Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208 (HL), the labour Court-

“was not empowered to inquire and so had no jurisdiction to determine. Its purported ‘determination”, not being “a determination” within the meaning of the empowering legislation, was accordingly a nullity. "

  1. Accordingly, this Court finds itself echoing firmly the sentiment of Lord Reid in the Anisminic Case that when a tribunal with limited Jurisdiction reaches a wrong conclusion as to the width of its powers then this Court sitting in judicial review must be able to correct that situation-

“not because the tribunal has made an error of law, but because as a result of making an error of law they have dealt with and based their decision on a matter with which, on a true construction of their powers, they had no right to deal. If they base their decision on some matter which is not prescribed for their adjudication, they are doing something which they have no right to do and if the view which I expressed earlier is right, their decision is a nullity.”

  1. It has not further escaped this Court’s attention that in this very jurisdiction, the Appellate Division itself has clearly subscribed to and upheld this dictum, for example, in Pabna Mental Hospital vs Tossadek Hossain reported in 13 BLT (AD) 2005, 91 in holding thus:

“No authority can exceed the power given to it. Any action taken by the Petitioner in derogatory to the law or rules set for the purpose or in defiance of the principles of natural justice would make the purported exercise of jurisdiction invalid or in excess of jurisdiction. Thus High Court Division could interfere with the impugned order when the person proceeded did not get proper opportunity to defend himself and when it found that the act done or proceeding taken is vitiated by lack of jurisdiction or by being in excess of jurisdiction.”

  1. Noted also is the fact that such an intervention in judicial review in Certiorari drawing on the express limits of exercise of jurisdiction by the First labour Court under section 213 of the act has also previously been addressed by this Court with regard to Airtel as a Service Receiver and ELSL as the Contractor. These cases pertained to services provided in the establishment of Airtel by 51 individuals as peons/tea boys and in which this Court in its judgment of 27-10-2011 in Writ Petition No. 5561 of 2011 and 50 other Writ Petitions made the Rule absolute and quashed the section 213 proceedings before the First labour Court. This Court in the present facts and circumstances finds no reason to digress from that course of action and interventions as previously undertaken given its findings and observations of law specifically as elaborated hereinabove.

  2. Considering the above this Court finds merit in the Application and substance in the Rule issued.

  3. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. The Impugned Order No. 1 dated 24-11-2009 passed by the Respondent No. 1 registering BLL (IR) Case No. 362 of 2009 and Violation Misc. Case No/181 of 2011 arising out of the aforesaid BLL Case, now pending before the First labour Court, Dhaka, are, hereby declared to have been made without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect. Consequentially, BLL Case No. 362 of 2009 stands declared to have been dismissed. This Judgment by its very terms findings and observations shall without prejudice govern the substantive consideration and final disposal of Writ Petition Nos. 1105 of 2012, 1107 of 2012, 1108 of 2012, 1109 of 2012, 1110 of 2012, 1111 of 2012, 1112 of 2012, 1113 of 2012, 1114 of 2012, 1115 of 2012, 1116 of 2012, 1117 of 2012, 1118 of 2012, 1119 of 2012, 1120 of 2012, 1121 of 2012, 1122 of 2012, 1123 of 2012 and 1251 of 2012 in like forms as above to the fullest.

There is no Order as to costs.